During the 1980s the question of responsibility for the Katyn massacre acquired a symbolic importance in the context of dynamic developments within the Soviet bloc. This was particularly true in Poland itself, where the mass expression of joy and enthusiasm that had greeted the Papal election of Karol Wojtyla, the Cardinal Archbishop of Cracow, in 1978 was in sharp contrast to the growing intolerance and distrust of ordinary Poles for the Communist regime. The independent trade union Solidarity, emerging from the frustration engendered from years of industrial strife coupled with fresh anger arising from food price hikes, had attracted 10 million members. It was banned following the military crackdown of 13 December 1981 and the proclamation of martial law by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman of the new Military Council of National Salvation. Meanwhile, the unofficial and illegal annual celebrations of the April anniversary of the discovery of the bodies at Katyn grew larger each year.⁷⁰

Just as the impetus for any lasting change in the Polish political situation had to come from the Soviet Union, so too did any initiative for the resolution of the Katyn controversy. The appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985 and his initiation of a policy of Glasnost (Openness) was to prove crucial for Poland and for the Katyn issue. At a meeting in Moscow on 21 April 1987, Jaruzelski and Gorbachev agreed to the creation of a joint Soviet-Polish Historical Commission to enquire into 'blank spots' in the history of their bilateral relations. These included controversial matters such as the secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 which led to the partition of Poland, the subsequent deportation of more than one million Poles to the Soviet Union in 1939-1941, and the Red Army's failure to relieve the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. They also agreed to investigate the Katyn Massacre.⁷¹

In the UK, the 1980s saw dwindling public, press and Parliamentary interest in Katyn, although the Historians and Research Analysts within the FCO continued to keep a close watch on emerging evidence or documentation. The issue was brought back to official, as well as public attention, in 1988. Mr. Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Poland from 11-16 July prompted interest in Parliament and speculation that he would raise the Katyn issue. A brief for the Secretary of State, Sir Geoffrey Howe, correctly concluded that it was 'premature' to look for an admission of Soviet responsibility at this stage.⁷² Indeed, Gorbachev made little reference during his visit to the Historical Commission's work, though he described Soviet-Polish relations as being more 'open and filled with commitment' in an address on 11 July.⁷³

On 11 July 1988 in the House of Lords, Lord Chelwood asked the Government whether they had reached any conclusions about responsibility for the Katyn massacre. Lord Glenarthur, Minister of State in the FCO, replied:

Successive British Governments have made clear their shock and repugnance at the Katyn massacre. None of the studies to date has produced conclusive evidence of responsibility, nor the fate of those interned in Ostashkov and Starobielsk. We await with interest the findings of the joint Soviet-Polish Historical Commission which, we understand, is currently studying the matter.⁷⁴

This reply provoked critical comment. Professor Norman Davies of the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies at the University of London, wrote to Lord Glenarthur on 20 July expressing doubts about the effectiveness of the Commission, 'an inter-Party body, with not a single independent historian to its name'.⁷⁵ A covering minute by Eastern European Department (EED) acknowledged:

The implication of Professor Davies's remarks, i.e., that we should not trust the findings of the Commission, may be justified. The Commission has been set up by the two regimes, it will not be given access to anything the Soviet authorities do not wish to have examined, and its workings may be subject to official pressures from both sides. Nevertheless there is some evidence that both Governments may now be willing to see the truth about Katyn revealed, and that the Commission will gain access to further archival evidence that still exists - if any exists at all, which must be open to considerable doubt - and there is at least a fair chance that the Commission will produce a reasonably objective assessment.⁷⁶

Lord Glenarthur's reply also prompted strong criticism from Lord Bethell and others who believed that Ministerial attendance at the annual ceremony at the Katyn Memorial since 1979 implied acknowledgement of Soviet responsibility.⁷⁷ Lord Bethell wrote to Mr. Charles Powell, the Prime Minister's Private Secretary:

Our Foreign Office, even in 1943, amid the demands of war, was pretty well convinced of Soviet guilt for the Katyn massacre. Since the war other evidence has emerged to support this conclusion, including a Commission of Enquiry set up by the United States Congress. There is no Western historian, to my knowledge, who still believes that Nazi Germany was responsible... I was quite surprised when the FCO came up with the old '1976 answer' to Tufton Chelwood's PQ on the matter... I do hope that the FCO will now take another look at this vexed question and decide to change the wording of the answer put forward whenever the question is asked.⁷⁸

Preparing a response, the Head of Eastern European Department submitted that: 'The main argument for maintaining the present position is that no new evidence has appeared which would justify such a shift... The chief argument for modifying our position is that the Soviet Union itself appears to be willing to re-examine the question.' He noted that Sir Bryan Cartledge, HM Ambassador in Moscow, favoured a 'tactical shift. He thinks that a British statement hinting that Stalin was responsible would avoid difficulties with the current Soviet Government.' The Head of EED recommended a reply to Lord Bethell accepting the 'significant historical evidence pointing at Soviet guilt', but stressing that the evidence remained 'inconclusive'.⁷⁹ On this basis the Assistant Under-Secretary advised the Secretary of State: 'there are no new objective factors to justify a change in our public line. Any such change would be based on a subjective decision that in domestic political terms it is expedient to do so.' He noted, however, 'the new element': 'the 'Gorbachev factor', i.e. the possibility—I put it no higher—that the Russians may before long be prepared to face the truth (if that is what it is) in this matter as they are beginning to do in others'.⁸⁰ The Secretary of State approved a modification of the position that there was insufficient evidence to accuse the Soviet Union of responsibility: 'the time has come to point the finger more clearly at the Russians'.⁸¹ The Prime Minister concurred.⁸²

The modified line was deployed in answers to PQs put by Mr. David Atkinson, MP and Lord Chelwood on 27 August 1988. The latter hoped that the Government could 'go further' than the reply to his PQ of 11 July. Lord Glenarthur responded:

There is indeed substantial circumstantial evidence pointing to Soviet responsibility for the killings. We look to the Soviet/Polish commission on Katyn to settle the question once and for all.⁸³

It was acknowledged that the Government could be asked whether this amounted to a change in the official view on responsibility for Katyn and if so, why. The Assistant Private Secretary to Sir Geoffrey Howe noted:

Since we cannot of course point to any new evidence, the Secretary of State considers that it would be better to take the line that our view has not changed; all we have done is to acknowledge the substantial circumstantial evidence; and (as in the PQ) we look to the Commission to settle the matter once and for all.⁸⁴

Lord Glenarthur's reference to the 'substantial circumstantial evidence' of Soviet responsibility received a 'low-key but generally favourable' reception in the media. Looking further afield, EED noted that: 'France and Italy report little public interest and a neutral government stance. The West Germans are convinced of Soviet responsibility but (like the Danes) take the view that this is a matter for historians. The State Department's informal view is that the available evidence points to Soviet responsibility. Our new line therefore takes us somewhat further from the European and closer to the US line.'⁸⁵

Interest now focussed on the work of the Soviet-Polish Historical Commission. Mr. S.J. Barrett, HM Ambassador in Warsaw, reported the publication in the Warsaw weekly Odrodzenie on 16 February 1989 of the 1943 Red Cross report on the Katyn massacre, with a short introduction by Professor Jarema Maciszewski, head of the Polish side of the Historical Commission. The Ambassador commented:

This is the first time that the sensitive 1940 date for the Katyn massacre has appeared in an official publication in Poland. The publication of the document is a remarkable step by the Poles given that the question is the subject of research by the joint Polish/Soviet Commission. This move was foreshadowed by a recent article in the Government daily which called for the release of Polish material on Katyn without waiting for the results of the joint Commission's work... it demonstrates Polish impatience with the lack of apparent progress on Katyn... The clear implication is that blame for the delay lies with the Soviet side.⁸⁶

Odrodzenie also published a commentary by Professor Wlodzimierz Kowalski, stating that the copy of the report now in the Public Record Office had been passed to the Foreign Office in June 1945 but had been 'classified'. This was picked up by the British press on 17 February⁸⁷ and aroused the interest of the Minister of State, Mr. William Waldegrave:

Is this new evidence? Is it true that the FCO kept the Polish Red Cross report in secret files to avoid damaging Anglo-Soviet relations at a sensitive time? Is it true that the report was sent to Mr. Hankey, who sent it to London where it was filed? Should we finally change our position on Russian guilt over Katyn, and if these allegations are true come clean and show a bit of British glasnost?⁸⁸

The Head of EED explained to Mr Waldegrave that the Polish Red Cross Report had been passed to the Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw, Mr. R.M. Hankey, by Mr. Skarzynski, Secretary General of the Polish Red Cross in 1943. In 1946, Mr. Hankey passed it to London, where it was classified Top Secret because Mr. Hankey warned that 'if it were known that Mr. Skarzynski had given us a copy, his life would be in danger'. The report had, however, been publicly available for over twelve years, having been transferred to the Public Record Office in 1977. Moreover, 'most (if not all) of its significant evidence has been in the public domain for many years' as Skarzynski had given a comprehensive testimony, covering 30 pages of the transcript, to the 1952 US House of Representatives Select Committee hearing on Katyn.⁸⁹ In regard to 'British glasnost' over the question of Russian guilt, EED argued that there was:

[A] broad consensus among experts that the circumstantial evidence for Soviet responsibility for the massacre is overwhelming. But there is no proof. The Polish side of the Polish-Soviet historical commission which is looking at Katyn and other 'blank spots' in Polish/Soviet history has urged the Soviet side to give it access to Soviet archives (likely to be those of the NKVD or Soviet military intelligence) which might contain such proof. So far they have not succeeded.

The publication of the Red Cross report in Poland with Professor Maciszewski's introduction constituted an 'unprecedented indication of Polish impatience':

For the first time, the Polish authorities have acknowledged that there is evidence pointing to Soviet guilt. There are reports in today's British press that in another remarkable move, the Polish authorities have decided to change the wording and date on the Warsaw memorial to the victims of Katyn.

The Soviet position was also evolving:

Moscow Radio on 20 February carried a piece on the Polish Red Cross report which referred to evidence that the massacre could have taken place in early 1940. If so, 'there could only be one perpetrator, the NKVD'. This is a remarkable development which may indicate that the USSR is about to admit responsibility. On the other hand it may not; it is clear that there has been a fierce internal debate in Moscow over Katyn.⁹⁰

The Head of EED suggested that the British Government's line should remain unchanged, but anticipated future pressure if the Commission's progress was slow, and possible questions 'from the Katyn lobby or even the USSR, on whether we ourselves are still withholding any evidence on Katyn'. Library and Records Department (LRD) were requested to investigate,⁹¹ and Mr. Waldegrave asked to be kept informed. Meanwhile, he agreed to maintain the current line on Katyn, though remarking that 'I don't think Britain's role has been very glorious in this'.⁹² Mr. Waldegrave's comments were circulated to Sir Geoffrey Howe, who recalled his own view that the 'old line was untenable'.⁹³

Developments concerning Katyn were proceeding apace in Poland. Following articles in the official press, such as the Odrodzenie articles and a feature in the weekly Polityka on 18 February pointing to Soviet responsibility for the massacre, the Polish Government seemed to be moving towards an official accusation of the Soviet Union. At a press conference on 21 February, the Government's press spokesman, Mr. Jerzy Urban, referred to Polish press articles and the Radio Moscow commentary acknowledging the Polish Red Cross report as strong circumstantial evidence of NKVD guilt for Katyn. This led EED to comment: 'The Polish authorities appear to have decided that unilateral action over Katyn is now the best way of prompting progress over the question on the Soviet side.'⁹⁴

HM Embassy in Warsaw also reported a speech on 24 February 1989 by the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Tadeusz Olechowski, who said that the historical blank spots in Polish-Soviet relations remained a continuing concern to the Polish authorities who hoped for an acceleration in the work of the Joint Commission. Moreover, a plethora of items on Katyn appeared in the Polish press in late February leading an Embassy official to assert that: 'The Poles have certainly broken the silence in no mean fashion, and the press is now full of items on Katyn. These abound in hints, allusions and descriptions of circumstantial evidence. But the Polish authorities have stopped short of pronouncing on Soviet responsibility. That remains a matter for the Joint Commission.'⁹⁵

As Solidarity and the Polish opposition were holding round-table talks with the Party and Polish Government in Warsaw, talks which were to result in the collapse of Communism in Poland, the Joint Commission met in Moscow between 28 February and 2 March 1989. Mr. Urban informed a press conference on 7 March that the Polish historians had presented the Soviet side with an experts' report on the Polish and Western documents relating to Katyn, and that in the view of the Polish side, 'everything indicated that the crimes were perpetrated by the NKVD'. However, a communiqué issued that same day following a Politburo meeting cautioned that 'the work of the Joint Commission could not be accomplished under the pressure of stirred emotions. Blank spots should not be used for anti-Soviet aims.' A report to the FCO from Warsaw noted: 'Through Urban, the Polish authorities have for the first time placed the blame for Katyn directly on the Russians... The latest meeting of the Joint Commission does not appear to have produced the desired move on the Soviet side and the Polish side must resign themselves to a further wait'.⁹⁶

In the autumn of 1989 when the first Solidarity Government had been formed, there were further developments on Katyn in Poland. On 30 September in the Sejm (Polish Parliament), the Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Kulski, 'gave one of the clearest statements yet from the Polish Government on the Katyn question'. Mr. Kulski reiterated Mr Urban's earlier reference to NKVD responsibility for the massacre and stressed the need to uncover the full truth about the crime as quickly as possible and to punish those responsible. The Polish Government had asked the Soviet Union several times to reveal all their archival evidence, and believed that the Katyn question raised not only moral but also social, political and legal issues. 'The Government', he promised, 'will spare no efforts to ensure that the truth is fully revealed to the satisfaction of all Poles, that compensation is guaranteed for the victims and their families and that those responsible for the crime are sent to trial'.⁹⁷

On 12 October 1989, the Polish press reported that the Polish Prosecutor General had forwarded a request through diplomatic channels to his Soviet opposite number for an investigation into the Katyn massacre. The request referred to Polish and Soviet international obligations, on the grounds that Katyn constituted 'genocide' and as such was not subject to statutory limitations.⁹⁸ In a meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow on 23 November, Mr Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Solidarity Prime Minister since August, requested an honest appraisal of past crimes and misdeeds. Mr Gorbachev replied that he was 'more than ready to cooperate'.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, as the months passed and the April anniversary approached, there was still no sign of the Joint Commission's report, leading Professor Norman Davies to write on 27 March 1990: 'I wonder, in fact, whether it is not time for the FCO to rely on its own judgement.'¹⁰⁰ In reply, Mr. Waldegrave maintained that he saw 'no need for a particular statement to mark the 50th anniversary of the Katyn massacre, unless new evidence emerges by then which turns the substantial circumstantial evidence of Soviet responsibility into conclusive proof'.¹⁰¹

In the early spring of 1990, unofficial reports from the Soviet Union indicated that the Soviet Government might acknowledge Stalin's responsibility for the Katyn massacre to mark the 50th anniversary of the killings in April. These rumours proved correct. During President Jaruzelski's official visit to the Soviet Union between 12 and 16 April, Mr. Gorbachev presented him with copies of documentary material concerning Katyn,¹⁰² and on 13 April TASS issued a historic statement:

The question of clarifying the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Polish officers, interned in September 1939, has been raised over a long period of time in meetings between representatives of the Polish and Soviet Governments and more widely in public. Historians from the two countries have been engaged in the thorough research of the Katyn tragedy, including a search for documents. Very recently Soviet archivists and historians have discovered documents concerning Polish soldiers, who were held in the Kozelski, Starobelski and Ostashkovski camps by the Soviet NKVD. It emerges from these documents that in April-May 1940, out of about 15,000 Polish officers, held in these three camps, 394 were transferred to the Gryazovetski [Griazovietz] camp. The remainder were 'handed over' to the NKVD responsible for the Smolensk, Voroshilovograd and Kalinin regions and were never mentioned in NKVD records again.

The archive material as a whole leads to the conclusion that responsibility for the crimes of Katyn belonged to Beria, Merkulov and their assistants.¹⁰³ The Soviet side expresses deep regret over the Katyn tragedy and declares that it is one of the most serious crimes of Stalinism. Copies of the discovered documents will be handed over to the Polish side. The search for the archive material will continue.¹⁰⁴

The British Ambassador in Warsaw observed Polish reactions to the statement:

Many of the published reactions from politicians and historians have emphasised that the Soviet statement is by itself insufficient and opens as many questions as it answers. [The Solidarity Trade Union Chairman] Walesa in a statement somewhat cooler in tone than [the Government Spokeswoman] Niezabitowska's, called the Soviet statement 'a long awaited act of moral justice', but pointed to several important issues which remained outstanding: punishment of those responsible for the massacre, compensation for families of the victims and free access to sites of the atrocities in the Soviet Union... Not surprisingly the positive response to the confession has been muted by a feeling that it was long overdue. Nevertheless, the act of coming clean, however belatedly, provides a necessary foundation for the development of normal bilateral relations.¹⁰⁵

The Polish press also criticised Britain's role, claiming that the 'Foreign Office has long had access to proof of NKVD responsibility but refused to recognise this officially'. Similar allegations were made in the British press. On 18 April 1990, Mr. Waldegrave asked the PUS, Sir Patrick Wright, 'if we think that our rather legalistic and mealy-mouthed approach to this issue over the last 45 years has actually paid any dividends in terms of relations with the Soviet Union or with the Poles? Are there any lessons to learn for the future?¹⁰⁶ In response, the PUS asked the FCO's Research and Analysis Department 'to look at the attitude taken to this over the years, and to form a judgement'.¹⁰⁷

On 23 May 1990 the FCO's Director of Research submitted to the PUS his response to Mr. Waldegrave's questions about the impact of HMG's Katyn policy on relations with the Poles and Soviets. He took account of a minute of 24 April by the head of the FCO Historians, who, after placing successive positions on Katyn in the context of emerging evidence, commented that: 'When considering the merits of the 1943-1988 line on Katyn, it is worth noticing Lord Aberdare's observation in 1971 that 'Governments are not at liberty to voice half-formed views, speculations or suspicions' though 'historians are free to discuss this mystery and no doubt they will continue to do so'.'¹⁰⁸

The Director of Research explained that until 1988 HMG's policy was to suspend judgement because 'conclusive evidence' was lacking. 'But', he conceded, 'clearly, political factors also played a part', which varied according to the times: the wartime alliance; the wish to avoid 'unproductive anti-Soviet propaganda'; and the desire not to upset relations with the Soviet Union during the years of détente in the 1970s. Though the Director of Research admitted that 'HMG's approach on Katyn until 1988 was, as Mr. Waldegrave says, mealy-mouthed', it was not, he suggested, 'much out of line with that of our major allies'. This policy had 'succeeded in postponing Katyn as an explicit issue in our relations with the Soviet Union and Poland until the 1970s' but 'it brought no particular benefit to British interests. The question perhaps is what real damage might have been done to British relations with the Soviet Union or Poland, or more widely, if Ministers had gone further, earlier than 1988 and in isolation from our major allies, towards acknowledging the weight of evidence pointing to Soviet responsibility':

Any shift in our policy not supported by our allies would certainly have caused surface tension, for a time, in bilateral relations with both the Soviet Union and Poland. In the absence of any fresh and conclusive evidence, there would have been accusations that this was a deliberately unfriendly act, politically motivated, an attempt to sabotage détente etc... In relations with the Soviet Union, real British interests might have suffered. A contract or two might have gone elsewhere. And our allies might have felt that we were gratuitously complicating the atmosphere e.g. at the CSCE negotiations.¹⁰⁹

The Head of the FCO's Library and Records Department (LRD) did not entirely agree, however. There was little evidence in the FCO archive, he noted, to suggest that—excepting the period of the Second World War—Britain's allies had any significant influence on her Katyn policy: 'Keeping in step with our Allies may have been implicit, [but] it was not explicitly considered in the papers I have seen', he concluded.¹¹⁰

The Director of Research also addressed the question of why HMG's attitude to the massacres had apparently remained so constant, if not indeed ossified:

The main lesson to be learnt, perhaps, is that any longstanding policy should be regularly re-assessed, especially if it is in any way controversial, and looked at again with special care if background circumstances are undergoing a process of change... But once the Russians had agreed to investigate the issue jointly with the Poles, the odds against an eventual proof or admission of Soviet guilt shortened considerably. The Government would have been badly wrong-footed if our line had not changed well before the Russians did, in the end, admit to what they had done.¹¹¹

Again, however, the Head of LRD demured:

if the main lesson of Katyn is that long-standing policies should be regularly re-assessed... then the lesson has already been well learned since few policies can have been so regularly dusted off and re-examined as Katyn. Present concern would appear to be more about why the FCO did not come up with a different answer before 1988 rather than how many times the question was looked at. The weak link in the chain seems to be the drift from 1979 onwards which demonstrates the well-known problem of trying to have it both ways and not changing policies with which, at the time, we are comfortable.¹¹²

First page of Beria's 5 March, 1940 letter to Stalin recommending the liquidation of the Polish officers and other influential Poles (Stalin's signature is underlined).  (IMG, 76K)

Britain's refusal to attribute blame for the Katyn massacres was, he concluded, less conditioned by fears of damaging Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-Polish relations, and more due to the philosophy, articulated by Lord Aberdare in 1971, that it was 'not the responsibility of Governments to act as a sort of historical arbiter... [which] could create a dangerous precedent'. Mr. Waldegrave remained unconvinced, describing the Aberdare comments as 'the sort of nonsense that politicians should not be allowed to talk: our line was not value-free itself, and being tough about precedents is what ministers are employed for'.¹¹³ The Secretary of State himself, Mr. Douglas Hurd, agreed: 'we have learned that we should be braver about separating our need to deal with tyrannies from our need to avoid offence to them'.¹¹⁴

In June 1990 further evidence of Soviet culpability emerged with the discovery of the mass graves of 3,920 Starobelsk Poles near the village of Piatikhatki on the outskirts of Kharkov. In the same month the bodies of 6,200 Ostashkov Poles were unearthed at Mednoye near Kalinin (now Tver).¹¹⁵ The grim fate of the Poles in the Starobelsk and Ostashkov camps had finally become certain. More was to come. In October 1992, HM Embassy in Warsaw reported that the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, had sent Mr. Lech Walesa, the Polish President, 'proof that Stalin ordered the Katyn massacres and claims that his successors, including Gorbachev, suppressed the truth'. This telegram stated that 'the most significant document is described by the Polish press as a Politburo decision, dated 5 March 1940, authorising the shooting of 14,700 Polish officers and 11,000 other imprisoned Poles'. The document was signed by Stalin and the NKVD chief, Beria, among others. In addition, there was a second folder of documents which 'reportedly demonstrate that all CPSU General Secretaries, including Gorbachev, knew of the existence' of the incriminating 1940 document. According to a 1959 KGB report, some 21,857 Poles had been murdered by the NKVD after March 1940. The Ambassador commented:

The Katyn massacres are the most sensitive point in recent Russo-Polish relations. These documents merely confirm Polish certainties, and the Poles are well aware that they are being used by Yeltsin to attack Gorbachev and the Communist Party. Nonetheless there is a genuine sense of gratitude to Yeltsin for having righted a wrong. It remains to be seen whether there will now be claims for compensation from the victims' families.¹¹⁶

Although Russian media coverage of the disclosure focused upon Mr. Yeltsin's political motives in aiming to 'counteract enduring sympathy for Gorbachev in the West', the historical relevance was not entirely obscured. Sir Brian Fall, HM Ambassador in Moscow, wrote that the 'horror' of Katyn 'competes for attention' with later reports to successive General Secretaries, from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Gorbachev, 'on the need to prevent the truth coming out'. Sir Brian continued: 'The documents were kept in 'File Number One', held in a special section of the Central Committee's secret archive, with outside access limited to the General Secretary of the CPSU in person... The substance of these revelations... underlines Yeltsin's status as the man who put an end to Soviet Communism's cover-ups'.¹¹⁷

Moscow's revelations of 1990 and 1992, coupled with the further discoveries of mass graves, led to renewed Parliamentary and public interest in the availability of British records about Katyn. James Pawsey MP asked four PQs on the subject between November 1990 and 1991,¹¹⁸ and Louis FitzGibbon, the prominent Katyn author and campaigner, continued to allege a British Government cover-up over knowledge of the massacre.¹¹⁹ Indeed, it was noted in December 1992 that since the Soviet admission in April 1990 no less than 13 PQs had been asked on a variety of Katyn related subjects, some pertaining to issues of responsibility and others to the possibility that perpetrators were resident in the UK. When some questioners asked about the availability of records, the Head of the FCO Historians stated that, although eight papers were retained by the FCO from 1943 on Polish-Soviet relations, only one of these concerned Katyn, and was 'withheld for reasons of provenance rather than content'.¹²⁰ All these papers were re-reviewed during 1993, and in response to further questions from Mr. Pawsey the Minister of State, Mr. Alastair Goodlad, confirmed in July 1994 that six previously closed files would be available at the Public Record Office from late August. It was also confirmed that none of the remaining files in the FCO related to the Katyn massacre, and that to the best of the FCO's knowledge there were no files on Katyn over thirty years old which were not in the public domain.¹²¹